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1.  ABSTRACT
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze technical change in the electricity distribution sector
in South America, in the period 1994-1997. We do so by estimating a Maximum Likelihood
stochastic frontier. We found that there is no evidence of catching up effects in the sector during
this period. Besides, there is partial evidence that suggests that countries which reformed their
electricity sector had a better performance than those which did not. We also found an increase in
the capital share in the countries that made the reform and an increment in the labor share in the
ones that did not make the reform.
I.  INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the technological evolution in the electricity
distribution sector in South America. We do so by estimating a stochastic production frontier
with Maximum Likelihood for the period 1994-1997.
Following the process initiated by Chile in the early ‘80s, many countries in South America
have undergone deep transformations in their electric industries, which include both restructuring
and privatization of the prevailing public monopolies. As a result of these processes, a strong
change in the role of government has occurred, leaving its producer and firm owner roles to
become a regulator of those activities that constitute natural monopolies (namely transmission
and distribution).
In this new regulatory role, the comparison of the relative efficiency of several regional
monopolies seems to be a potentially valuable instrument to reduce the asymmetry of information
that characterized the regulator-firm relationship. This fact has been recognized in many of the
reform processes in which horizontal break-up of transmission and distribution firms was an
important ingredient of the transformations.
In this context, the productive frontier estimates can be helpful to the regulators as a tool in the
setting of the X factor in a price cap regime of the form RPI-X+K. This factor reflects the
expected price falls due to efficiency gains the firms can achieve during the duration of the price
cap. These efficiency gains are basically of two types: shifts of the frontier and efficiency gains
due to catching up. The first of these terms must be included in the X factor of all the firms of the4
sector. That is, if it is expected a productivity growth of 1% per year, all the firms must have this
rate incorporated in the X factor. However, the firms that are not on the frontier can reduce their
costs (and increase their efficiency) in a magnitude equal to their current inefficiency. The X
factor will include, in this case, the shift of the frontier of the sector plus an additional term that
will have the purpose of eliminating the differences between the firm and the frontier.
However, to be useful in the regulatory process this tool needs two conditions to be satisfied.
On the one hand, it requires a broad set of comparable firms and detailed information about them.
In this respect CIER’s effort to build up a regional database is a fundamental contribution for the
development of efficient regulation of electric utilities. But, on the other hand, this availability of
data, although a necessary condition, is far from sufficient. One must count on adequate
techniques that allow an exhaustive analysis of the available data with reference to an appropriate
conceptual framework. Our objective in this paper fits into this criterion, trying to contribute to
the development of instruments that provide an efficient regulation of the firms in this sector.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the theoretical structure of the
estimated production function model. Section III presents the data and empirical results. Section
IV concludes.
II.  THE MODEL
An important feature of the regulated utilities is that, in general, the firms are under the
obligation of providing the service at the specified tariffs. Therefore, the firms must meet the
demand for their service and are not able to choose the level of output they will offer. Given the
exogeneity of the output levels, the firm maximizes profit simply by minimizing the cost of
producing a given level of output. This implies that cost frontiers are the theoretically sound
choice to estimate.
However, there are other theoretical as well as practical arguments that oppose to the former
ones. Among these is the difficulty to obtain accurate information on input prices. Moreover, the
estimation of cost frontiers involves the use of variables measured in monetary units (data on
costs as well as on input prices is needed), which could be a serious problem if one wishes to
make international comparisons. Production functions, instead, only require variables measured
in physical units (homogeneous –or at least much more homogeneous among countries).
As a theoretical argument, one could add that whenever there exists public ownership, firms in
general do not seek profit maximization as their main goal. Besides, in this kind of firms, prices
may not be available nor reliable (Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978).
(i)  Since we are attempting an international comparison on several countries in our sample
whose electricity firms are owned by the public sector, in this paper we estimate a production
frontier. The stochastic production function model (Cobb-Douglas) with panel data is written as
Yit = β0 + X’it β + εit,
where Yit is the natural logarithm of the output of decision making unit (DMU, hereafter) i
(i=1, 2,...,N) at time t (t=1,2,...,T), Xit is the corresponding matrix of k inputs (and environmental
variables, also in logs) and β is a kX1 vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. The error
term is specified as5
εit = vit – uit.
The vit are statistical noise and are assumed to be independently and identically distributed,
while uit are non-negative random variables which represent technical efficiency. The vit
represent those effects that cannot be controlled by the DMU, such as measurement errors,
omitted variables and weather conditions. Technical inefficiency, on the other hand, accounts for
those factors that can be controlled by the DMU, and can be defined as the discrepancy between a
DMU’s actual and potential outputs.
Though various distributions have been suggested in the literature for this term the most
common in empirical papers, and the one that will be used in this paper, is the half normal. This
distribution assumes that the majority of the firms are almost quasi efficient. There is, however,
no theoretical reason that impedes that inefficiency be distributed symmetrically as vi. Since it is
not convenient in empirical applications to impose the model an a priori distribution of the
inefficiency term, it is preferable to use a more flexible distribution. A proposed distribution is
the truncated normal (Stevenson, 1980), which is a generalization of the half-normal distribution.
This distribution is obtained by truncating at zero a normal distribution with median µ and
variance σ
2. Setting µ to zero reduces to the traditional half-normal model. Therefore, we contrast
the null Ho: µ=0. This can be done with a generalized likelihood-ratio test, LR.
To represent the temporal evolution of the inefficiency term we use a model proposed by
Battese and Coelli (1992):
uit = exp[-η(t-Ti)]ui    (1),
where η is a parameter to be estimated and ui are assumed to be i.i.d. as truncations at zero of
the N(µ,σ
2) distribution. The level of technical efficiency of DMU i in period t is obtained as
EFit = exp(-uit).
Battese and Coelli (1992) show that the best predictor of exp(-uit) is obtained by using the
conditional expectation of exp(-uit) given εit, E[exp(-uit)/εit].
In this specification, since the exponential function, exp[-η(t-Ti)], has a value of one when
t=T, the random variable ui can be considered as the technical inefficient effect for the i-th DMU
in the last period of the panel. For earlier periods, the technical efficiency effects are the product
of the technical inefficient effect for the i-th DMU in the last period of the panel and the value of
the exponential function, whose value depends on the parameter η, and the number of periods
before the end period of the panel. If η is positive then the model shows decreasing inefficiency
effects, while if η is negative the inefficiency effects are increasing (Coelli et al. 1998). A
disadvantage of this specification is that the ordering of the firms according to the magnitude of
the technical inefficiency effects is the same at all time periods.
1 The main advantage, at least for
our purposes, is that the technical inefficiency changes over time can be distinguished from
technical change. The latter is obtained by including a time trend (and eventually its square) in
the regressor vector.














2). The parameter γ must lie between zero and
                                                          
1 A more general specification such as the one proposed by Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990) allows for greater
flexibility but is more demanding in terms of data.6
one. A value of γ of zero indicates that the deviations from the frontier are due entirely to noise,
while a value of one would indicate that all deviations are due to technical inefficiency. This
specification allows us to test the null hypothesis that there are no technical inefficiency effects in
the model, H0: γ=0, versus the alternative hypothesis H1: γ>0.
An important advantage of this model is its great flexibility, which allows testing different
specifications in order to choose the one that best fits the data. In this paper we test the hypothesis
that the inefficiency term has a half-normal distribution (H0: µ=0) vis a vis the more flexible
truncated (at zero) normal. We also contrast the hypothesis that the inefficiency is time invariant
(H0: η=0), and the null that there is not technical change in the analyzed period.
III.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The model
The model presented in section II will be used to estimate a production frontier, with which
we will test different hypotheses about the behavior of the inefficiency and the technical change
in a sample of 36 electricity distribution firms in South America in the period 1994-1997.
The first important decision we have to make was the choice of the variables to include in the
model. Neuberg (1977) describes four related but distinguishable activities in electricity
distribution. Firstly, distribution properly which includes maintenance of equipment and
installations to users and load dispatch. Secondly, meter reading and billing. Thirdly, sales
including related activities such as publicity and fourthly administration. Neuberg suggests four
variables as main cost drivers in electricity distribution: number of customers served, total KWh
sold, Km of distribution lines and Km
2 of distribution area. Burns et al. (1994) add some
additional variables: maximum demand (which determines system configuration and size),
transform capacity (which affects losses) and demand structure (which determines load factors at
different moments of the day).
The main conceptual problem is to identify within this set of variables which one or ones are
the output. Neuberg discards the possibility of treating distribution companies as multiproduct
firms given that the different variables cannot be separately sold and/or priced. For example, once
the number of clients is identified as the product (with a price equal to average annual revenue
per customer of the firm), energy sales in (KWh) cannot be sold separately. Given that the
remaining variables cannot be considered outputs (nor inputs for which a price is paid) they can
be introduced in the model as specific characteristics of the firms to allow for comparisons
among them.
The initial estimated production function is:
Ln CUSTOMER = β0 + β1 Ln KMNET + β2 Ln EMPLOYEE + β3 Ln AREA + β4 Ln
TRANSF + β5 Ln STRUCT + β6 Ln SALES + β7 TIME + β8 (TIME*DREFORM),
where Ln stands for natural logarithm. The dependent variable is the number of customers
(CUSTOMER), and the regressors are the following ones: distribution lines (KMNET, in km),
number of employees in the distribution sector (EMPLOYEE), service area (AREA, in km
2),
transformers (TRANSF, in KVA), proportion of sales to residential customers (a proxy of the
market structure, STRUCT), and sales (SALES, in MWh). We include a time trend in the model
to account for technical change, and an interaction variable between time and a dummy, which7
takes a value of one when the firm belongs to a country which has already reformed its electricity
sector and zero otherwise.
The data
The raw data used in this work has been obtained from the Secretaría General de la Comisión
de Integración Eléctrica Regional (CIER) reports, “Datos Estadísticos. Empresas Eléctricas. Año
1994”, and “Datos Estadísticos. Empresas Eléctricas. Años 1995-1996-1997”. The database
includes information about a large number of variables for the following countries: Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Perú, Uruguay and Venezuela. Table 1
shows the firms and years for which the data was available.
Table 1
Country Firm 1994 1995 1996 1997
Argentina (R) EMSA X X
EDET X X
EDENOR X
Bolivia (R) CESSA X X X
CRE X
Brasil CEB X X X X
CELG X X X
CEMAT X
CEMIG X X X X
CESP X X
COPEL X
Chile (R) CONAFE X X X X
EDELMAG X X X X
Colombia (R) CHEC X
EEPPM X X X X
ENERCALI X X X
EPSA X X
ESSA X X X
Ecuador EEQSA X X
EERCSCA X X
EERSSA X X X




Paraguay ANDE X X X X







SEAL X X X X
Uruguay UTE X8
Venezuela CALEV X X X X
CALEY X X X
ELECAR X X X X
ELEGGUA X X X X
ELEVAL X X X X
ENELCO X X X
ENELVEN X X X
We mark with an X the data available, and with a (R) the countries that made the reform of their
electricity sector.
The summary statistics of the sample of 36 firms are presented in table 1. In the Statistical
Appendix the data series are presented.
Table 2
Basic Statistics
Variable Sample Size Mean Standard
Deviation
Number of Customers 104 502893 838331
Residential/Total Sales (%) 104 40 15
Km. of net 104 173877 798887
Transformer Capacity (KVA) 104 1395624 2860505
Concession Area (km
2) 104 74354 161194
Sales (MWh) 104 3122201 6430711
Number of Employees at
Distribution
104 698 1505
We start our estimates with a flexible model and then we test different specifications using a
LR test, which requires the estimation of the model under both the null and the alternative
hypotheses. The statistic is calculated as
LR = -2[LR - LU],
where LR is the log-likelihood of the restricted model (i.e., the half-normal specification) and LU
is the log-likelihood of the unrestricted model. The LR statistic has a chi-square distribution with
degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions involved (in this instance one).
In a first step we test the null hypothesis that there are no technical inefficiency effects in the
model. Comparing the log-likelihood of the ML and OLS model we found that there are
significative differences between them.
2 Since the LR statistic is greater than the critical value
                                                          
2 Some difficulties arise in testing the null Ho: γ=0 because γ=0 lies on the boundary of the parameter space for γ. In
this case, if the null is correct the LR statistic has asymptotic distribution, which is mixture of chi-square
distributions. The rule of thumb for a test of size α is: “Reject Ho if LR exceeds the chi-square value for a size 2α”
(Battese et al., 1998).9
(one degree of freedom), the null that there are no inefficiency effects in the sample can be
rejected.
3
The next step is to test the half-normal model versus the alternative truncated normal. The
estimated value of µ is 0.0078, and the log likelihood function of the unrestricted model is not
significative different from the log likelihood of the restricted (µ=0) model. Since we cannot
reject the null, in the final model the efficiency component is assumed to have a half-normal
distribution.
Finally, we test the time invariant inefficiency effect hypothesis. We do so by running two
models, one with the parameter η and another without it. The log likelihood of the unrestricted
model is 15.7, which is not significative greater than the log likelihood of the restricted (14.7,
when η=0) model. Since the LR test cannot rejects the null H0: η=0, we do not include η in the
model. The ML estimates of the initial model are presented in column A of table 3.
Table 3









































































                                                          









Log Likelihood 14.7 51.7 57.2
The t statistics are in parentheses.
4
In the initial model all the slope variables are not significant at the usual levels of confidence.
5
The mean efficiency is 0.60, with a maximum value of 0.97 and a minimum of 0.27. This wide
range of values can be explained by the heterogeneity of the sample.
Technical change can be analyzed through the coefficients of the variables TIME and
(TIME*DREFORM). Even though the variables were not significant at the usual levels of
confidence, the analysis of the signs of the coefficients suggest a better performance in those
countries that reformed their electricity sector. Given the ML estimated parameters, the total rate
of technical change is obtained as the first derivative of the natural logarithm of the production
function with respect to time, dy/dt, which in this particular case is equal to β7 + β8 *
DREFORM. Since DREFORM takes a value of one in the countries that made the reform and
zero otherwise, technical change is
δ Ln CUSTOMER/δ TIME = 0.012 + 0.015 * 1 = 0.027
in those countries that reformed their electricity sector, and
δ Ln CUSTOMER/δ TIME = 0.012
in the ones that did not made the reform. The resulting values can be interpreted as constant
annual growth rates, though in this particular case it is important to repeat that the null of non-
growth cannot be rejected.
The inclusion of a single time trend reflects what is known as Hicks neutral technical change.
That is, the intercept of the function shifts but the slope does not.
6 The non-neutral technical
change, on the other hand, can be calculated including the interaction terms between inputs and
time. The ML estimated model in this case is presented in column B of Table 3. As can be
observed, though in this model some of the variables become significant, the variables KMNET
and TIME*Ln EMPLOYEE are not significatively different form zero. Therefore, we can not
reject the null of neutrality. The same conclusion is obtained performing the LR test.
An alternative formulation arises if in the above model the interactions of the inputs and the
variable DREFORM are included, in order to analyze the different features (related to non-
neutral technical change) between the countries that made and did not make the reform. The ML
model is presented in column C of Table 3.
                                                          
4 For the estimates, we use FRONTIER 4.1, written by Coelli (1996).
5 It is worthwhile noting the differences between the ML and OLS estimates. In the last one, for example, all the
variables are significant.
6 That is, the marginal rate of substitution does not change.11
In this model, the new variables are significant (TIME*Ln KMNET*DREFORM and
TIME*Ln EMPLOYEE*DREFORM). This could be showing that technical change is non-
neutral and different among countries. That is, input elasticities are not constant. The output
elasticity with respect to capital (net) is now
δ Ln CUSTOMER/δ Ln NET = β1 + β9 TIME + β11 TIME*DREFORM
whereas the output elasticity with respect to labor is
δ Ln CUSTOMER/δ Ln EMPLOYEE = β2 + β10 TIME + β12 TIME*DREFORM.
The results are as expected, since the labor share is increasing in those countries that did not
made the reform, and the capital share increases in those countries that made the reform.
If technological change is non-neutral (as it is suggested by the model presented in column C),
the technical change can be different for different input utilization. Coelli et al. (1998) suggest
using a geometric mean to estimate technical change for adjacent periods s and t:
Technical Change = {[1+δf(Xis,τ,β)/δτ]×{[1+δf(Xit,τ,β)/δτ]}
0.5.
The first derivative is evaluated at τ=s and the second one at τ=t (f(.) is the analyzed function
and τ is time). Using this formula, the estimated mean annual rate of technical change in the
countries that reformed their electricity sector is 5.02%, whereas in the others the rate is about
3.55%.
To conclude, it is worth noting that the relative efficiency does not show significative
differences between the firms belonging to the countries that made or did not make the reform. In
the initial model, the efficiency in the countries that made the reform was higher, but this result
was reverted in the final model.
IV.  Conclusions
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the technological evolution in the electricity
distribution sector in South America. We do so by estimating a stochastic production frontier
with Maximum Likelihood for the period 1994-1997. We found that there is no evidence of
catching up effects in the sector. Besides, we found partial evidence suggesting that the countries
that made the reform in the electricity sector had performed better than the others. We also found
a growth in the capital share in the countries that made the reform, and an increment in the labor
share in the ones that did not make the reform.
One aspect that this methodology would allow to test in the future is the discrimination of
technical development by type of regulatory mechanism. The idea is that different types of
schemes can generate different schedules of technical change, not only regarding the intensity of
the technical change but also to qualitative features (for example, different schemes can incentive
different evolutions in input shares).
Thinking about the future, this kind of work highlights the importance of having homogeneous
databases in the different countries in order to make the comparisons. In this sense, it is important
to note the work of the Comisión de Integración Eléctrica Regional (CIER), source of the
information on which this study was based.12
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Year Country Cust. Sales Struct. Net Transf. Area Empl.
EMSA 1995 ARGENTINA 101721 388175 31 5346 227034 16206 261
1996 ARGENTINA 103798 418088 29 5526 253017 16206 257
EDET 1996 ARGENTINA 259667 881514 44 8825 520814 22434 197
1997 ARGENTINA 276560 961472 45 9365 548226 22434 190
EDENOR 1994 ARGENTINA 2083425 9086460 39 23426 3110000 4637 1155
CESSA 1995 BOLIVIA 28988 80901 35 43116 43116 49 53
1996 BOLIVIA 30685 84426 34 48822 48822 49 54
1997 BOLIVIA 33289 91969 36 52587 52587 49 51
CRE 1994 BOLIVIA 141809 661502 45 4983 409423 30828 226
CEB 1994 BRASIL 428580 2468832 39 6855 1317000 5783 734
1995 BRASIL 443912 2752474 39 12072 1359000 5783 764
1996 BRASIL 463958 2972650 39 12618 1427050 5783 743
1997 BRASIL 484384 3201539 39 13114 1496000 5783 668
CELG 1995 BRASIL 1149901 4865680 34 88541 2078706 337008 155
1996 BRASIL 1226236 69571 34 92352 2146539 337008 208
1997 BRASIL 1306017 5506092 35 94831 2202414 337008 178
CEMAT 1997 BRASIL 498427 2388674 44 5606 436000 901420 98
CEMIG 1994 BRASIL 3853651 30984232 16 7575500 562762 562762 8416
1995 BRASIL 4048556 32113038 18 253681 8159800 562762 7904
1996 BRASIL 4248069 33316098 19 263174 8633786 562762 7205
1997 BRASIL 4472975 34973256 20 274960 9266600 562762 6449
CESP 1994 BRASIL 1295725 8935918 22 72380 2102261 120884 3606
1995 BRASIL 1351919 9409343 23 79640 23881238 120884 3087
COPEL 1994 BRASIL 2310120 11636838 26 39661 7247000 191136 3286
CONAFE 1994 CHILE 104637 366959 34 1775 107660 615 133
1995 CHILE 109854 400613 34 1060 114972 638 121
1996 CHILE 115035 438932 33 1177 122780 1494 119
1997 CHILE 119517 467897 33 1265 131120 1494 118
EDELMAG 1994 CHILE 38778 116323 23 775 56103 61 28
1995 CHILE 39907 117432 51 781 58810 59 30
1996 CHILE 40588 125966 50 794 62983 60 32
1997 CHILE 41297 130308 51 800 65028 61 28
CHEC 1995 COLOMBIA 286650 1048235 56 5962 326590 9526 348
EEPPM 1994 COLOMBIA 643041 4542049 34 13393 2285637 1152 450
1995 COLOMBIA 680275 4589000 46 10866 2388502 1152 779
1996 COLOMBIA 711396 4621000 47 11111 2507982 1152 781
1997 COLOMBIA 756425 4929000 44 11354 2610000 1152 751
ENRCALI 1995 COLOMBIA 410310 3069 41 2120 984750 862 982
1996 COLOMBIA 428877 30.59 40 2096 1108040 862 982
1997 COLOMBIA 439643 3017 40 2096 1110900 862 915
EPSA 1996 COLOMBIA 281015 1216600 94 10947 293100 18572 251
1997 COLOMBIA 295726 1241200 94 14018 307200 18572 242
Year Country Cust. Sales Struct. Net Transf. Area Empl.
ESSA 1995 COLOMBIA 348753 1113222 43 35900 637604 30950 404
1996 COLOMBIA 359870 1070962 46 36150 640604 30950 30814
1997 COLOMBIA 372536 1115335 46 36329 642854 30980 306
EEQSA 1994 ECUADOR 378376 1477993 44 9159 873176 8765 278
1997 ECUADOR 454450 1845241 45 10011 1433000 13368 279
EERCSCA 1994 ECUADOR 136632 311718 40 7564 224414 9138 206
1996 ECUADOR 159315 357970 43 9056 255627 10152 204
EERSSA 1995 ECUADOR 76718 92972 87 2889 81000 35000 315
1996 ECUADOR 80532 107429 87 3304 90000 35000 306
1997 ECUADOR 84309 115725 59 3408 92203 35000 336
ELEPCOSA 1994 ECUADOR 55914 111837 31 1816 36849 3000 50
1995 ECUADOR 59271 116950 31 1985 39717 3000 52
1996 ECUADOR 60580 120646 37 2092 41162 3000 52
1997 ECUADOR 63476 134407 35 2192 38782 3000 52
EMELMANABI 1994 ECUADOR 115549 348491 42 3267 205483 16800 117
1995 ECUADOR 119798 370615 42 3337 304000 16800 91
1996 ECUADOR 128799 422223 41 3498 340570 16800 96
1997 ECUADOR 141475 467031 42 3570 362423 16800 99
ANDE 1994 PARAGUAY 589008 328974 41 24776 1537563 406752 760
1995 PARAGUAY 669325 3439887 42 33416 1712642 406752 758
1996 PARAGUAY 785370 3630065 44 39952 1825324 406752 745
1997 PARAGUAY 821622 3861080 45 45893 1941292 406752 749
ELC 1995 PERU 184672 395018 6 5473 143248 133255 153
1997 PERU 231187 398669 31 7602 1198956 133255 104
ELECTRO SUR 1994 PERU 50810 172224 34 1591 102839 31796 47
1995 PERU 55089 130998 42 1578 97000 31810 50
1996 PERU 63933 131193 44 1598 99000 31810 55
1997 PERU 70641 137701 44 1624 101000 31810 43
LUZ DEL SUR 1994 PERU 499644 2806165 37 10478 692105 2880 519
1995 PERU 556319 3007786 36 13161 1439300 2900 501
1996 PERU 603134 2837666 40 13718 1547300 2900 360
1997 PERU 628553 3045317 40 14062 1649800 2900 427
SEAL 1994 PERU 138110 332531 30 400 94950 63345 114
1995 PERU 154092 516673 28 4390 150000 63345 90
1996 PERU 175037 573118 27 4620 160000 63345 67
1997 PERU 189442 577134 26 5046 185000 63345 61
UTE 1994 URUGUAY 1054035 4632156 48 44239 2803000 176215 1810
CALEV 1994 VENEZUELA 281786 2461905 34 1583221 576 489 315
1995 VENEZUELA 276367 2686290 31 1615490 576 480 280
1996 VENEZUELA 275934 2566789 10 1619663 576 479 270
1997 VENEZUELA 277193 2576961 32 1660927 576 481 240
CALEY 1995 VENEZUELA 43664 176574 52 84905 1000 44 75
1996 VENEZUELA 44212 172129 51 84905 1000 44 73
1997 VENEZUELA 45465 189500 49 84905 1000 45 73
Year Country Cust. Sales Struct. Net Transf. Area Empl.
CALEY 1995 VENEZUELA 43664 176574 52 84905 1000 44 75
1996 VENEZUELA 44212 172129 51 84905 1000 44 73
1997 VENEZUELA 45465 189500 49 84905 1000 45 73
ELECAR 1994 VENEZUELA 562491 5805964 39 3302 3088081 2704 143115
1995 VENEZUELA 557000 5762687 24 3685 3201281 2704 1473
1996 VENEZUELA 560998 5690810 25 3754 3248590 2704 1133
1997 VENEZUELA 570068 5952225 24 3870 3264698 2704 1071
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1997 VENEZUELA 358365 5847708 73 8411 2303000 41442 25616
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